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Abstract 
This paper examines possible explanations for observed differences in the transmission of 
euro area monetary policy in central bank large-scale macroeconomic models. In particular it 
considers the extent to which these differences are due to differences in the underlying 
economies or (possibly unrelated) differences in the modelling strategies adopted for each 
country. It finds that, against most yardsticks, the cross-country variations in the results are 
found to be plausible in the sense that they correspond with other evidence or observed 
characteristics of the economies in question. Nevertheless, the role of differing modelling 
strategies may also play a role. Important features of the models –for instance in the 
treatment of expectations or wealth– can have a major bearing on the results that may not 
necessarily reflect differences in the underlying economies. 
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Non Technical Summary 
This paper seeks to examine possible explanations for observed differences in the 
transmission of euro area monetary policy in central bank large-scale macroeconomic 
models. To this end, it draws on the results of a carefully designed common monetary policy 
simulation experiment prepared within the Working Group on Econometric Modelling (WGEM) 
and reported by Van Els et al. (2001). As these results are based on a harmonised simulation 
experiment, observed cross-country differences in results can be due to either differences in 
the underlying economies or (possibly unrelated) differences in the modelling strategies 
adopted for each country. The paper adopts two complementary strategies for examining the 
sources of differences in monetary policy transmission in these model simulation results. First 
it examines various measures of these differences, and assesses whether they appear 
plausible on economic grounds. Second, it considers the role played by differences in model 
design. 
With regard to the plausibility of the results, a broadly based approach is adopted, 
whereby results are compared with structural and institutional characteristics of the respective 
national economies and with established business cycle properties. Financial structures and 
the fiscal policy framework appear to make some contribution to explaining part of the 
heterogeneity in the responses of countries to a monetary policy shock. There also appears to 
be a role for the credit channel as various financial indicators show some relationship with the 
pattern of results. In addition, entry barriers and the pervasiveness of the employment 
protection legislation appear to raise the economic costs of adjusting after a monetary policy 
shock. Industrial structure does not seem to explain much of the reported cross-country 
differences in the transmission mechanism. In relation to the decomposition into channels of 
transmission, the magnitude of most channels appear to bear at least some relation to prior 
beliefs based on information about the respective economies. 
With regard to business cycle properties, there appears to be some evidence that 
the transmission results corresponded to cross-country differences in various business cycle 
‘stylised facts’. In particular, a high volatility of consumption observed in the business cycle 
data may be indicative of a greater sensitivity of consumption to changing interest rates. This 
pattern is observed in the WGEM results, where the magnitude of the substitution channel 
seems to correspond to the volatility of private consumption. 
As a further robustness check, the results from the WGEM exercise are compared 
with some existing VAR evidence. However, it should be noted that the two sets of results are 
only partially comparable, as there are important differences in their treatment of monetary 
policy, and, indeed, the quantitative results differ quite markedly. The cross-country 
distribution of the maximum impact on prices is broadly similar across the two competing 
methodologies. However, the cross-country differences in maximum output effects obtained 
using the VAR model do not correspond well with those generated in the WGEM simulations. 
With regard to the role of differences in model design, it is found that the existence of 
alternative forward-looking elements in the models is one of the reasons for finding sizeable 
differences across model results, particularly with regard to the speed of adjustment. For the 
models that have explicitly incorporated market valuation of assets, the wealth channel 
becomes more significant. Irrespective of the way the NAIRU is modelled, the presence of the 
unemployment rate in the wage equation (or of other variables describing the non-competitive 
environment in the labour market) is a factor that influences how monetary policy affects the 
inflation rate. The monetary channel that is incorporated into the German model has an 
important impact on the transmission of monetary policy in this model. 
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To summarise, against most yardsticks, the cross-country variation in the WGEM 
results are found to be plausible. The results broadly correspond to the differences in 
business cycle properties across countries and most –but not all– economic, financial and 
structural statistics. When compared against the VAR evidence, the results are more mixed 
with similarities in the pattern of price –but not output– responses. Nevertheless, despite 
these signs that the results may reflect underlying economic differences, the role of differing 
modelling strategies should not be ignored. Important features of the models –for instance in 
the treatment of expectations or wealth– can have a major bearing on the results that may not 
necessarily reflect differences in the underlying economies. 
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1 Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to examine possible explanations for observed differences in 
the transmission of euro area monetary policy in central bank models. To this end, the 
paper draws on the results of a carefully designed common monetary policy simulation 
experiment prepared within the Working Group on Econometric Modelling (WGEM) and 
reported by Van Els et al. (2001). As these results are based on a harmonised simulation 
experiment, observed cross-country differences in results can be due to either differences in 
the underlying economies or (possibly unrelated) differences in the modelling strategies 
adopted for each country.  
Central bank models are in many respects highly informative tools for analysing 
monetary policy transmission, since they incorporate the ‘local wisdom’ on the response of 
the domestic economy to a policy impulse. In order to maximise their effectiveness as tools 
for analysing the working of a common monetary policy, they should meet a few 
requirements. First, they should distinguish the direct effects on output and prices of a 
change in interest rates from the indirect ones that work through the exchange rate. Second, 
they should allow for a simultaneous change in the policy instrument in all countries, as this 
will always be the case inside EMU. Third, they should allow some understanding of the 
sources and statistical significance of the cross-country differences detected in the 
transmission mechanism. The first two requirements are already met by the models used in 
the WGEM experiment, whilst the aim of this paper is to address the third.  
The models used in the WGEM exercise, being large scale, offer a detailed 
description of the working of the economy, in particular of the labour and goods markets and 
the channels of monetary policy transmission, and therefore it is possible to examine the 
sources of the cross-country asymmetries. The statistical significance of the differences is 
more problematic as the models have been designed independently, are not linked and there 
is no comprehensive set of information about the error-bounds attached to each simulation 
result. Nevertheless, to the extent possible, we also try to shed some light on this issue. 
This paper is structured in three sections. In Section 1, we examine the extent to 
which monetary policy transmission differs across countries, with a detailed analysis of the 
results which draws on measures of their distribution. In Section 2, we ask whether the 
observed differences are reliable. To this end, we compare the WGEM results with data on 
the business cycle properties of euro area countries, evidence from VAR models of monetary 
policy transmission and information on economic structures and institutions. The latter is 
done for both the overall results and the decomposition into channels of transmission. Finally, 
in Section 3, there is an assessment of the key features of model design that have an 
important impact on the results.  
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2 To What Extent Does Monetary Policy Transmission Differ Across Countries? 
We begin the analysis of cross-country differences in monetary policy transmission by seeking 
to identify how large these differences are in the WGEM results. Since the differences in 
monetary policy transmission cannot be inferred by a single measure, we examine a number 
of statistics1. In particular, we examine its impact on output, consumer spending, the sacrifice 
ratio and the deflators of consumption and GDP. However, in order to compare cross-country 
responses, it is first necessary to impose some structure on the data. 
The WGEM results express the endogenous variables in the monetary policy 
simulations ( tY ) in terms of percentage deviations from baseline values ( tY ) 
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proportionality factor is given by the size of the monetary policy shock. 
                                                                          
1. Nevertheless, we recognise the difficulty in obtaining formal tests of cross country differences given the small number 
of countries in our sample. An alternative avenue is the one considered by Dedola and Lippi (2000) that study monetary 
policy heterogeneity both across industries and countries. 
2. This assumption is not at all restrictive for behavioural and technical equations but implies that accounting identities 
hold only as an approximation. 
3. Exogenous variables do not cause any problem: they are, by construction, not Granger-caused by the endogenous 
variables and may therefore be separately solved in terms of their fundamental shocks. Somewhat more problematic is 
the interpretation of the change in the short-term interest rate as entirely due to a discretionary policy impulse, since this 
abstracts from the feed-back existing between the state of the economy and the systematic component of the monetary 
stance. A possible way out is the recognition that the policy interest rate does not move continuously but piecemeal, 
when changes in fundamentals are large enough to justify an adjustment. Accordingly, if the initial shock and the ensued 
response of the economy are small, the assumption of a fixed interest rate is a viable one. 
4. In order to reduce notation at a minimum, henceforth no index is used to distinguish variables across countries. The 
subscript l is therefore dropped. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 13 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0502 
The set of parameters { }kjδ  can then be compared across countries and related to 
the response of the euro area as a whole. The (scaled) interim variance 
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 between the country 
and aggregate responses can be used to assess whether the timing, direction and size of the 
adjustment in each country is similar to the one displayed at the aggregate level.  
Tables 1 to 4 report the values of these statistics for output, household consumer 
spending, the consumption deflator and the GDP deflator5. The statistical significance of 
the two statistics is also tested and the related results are shown in column 3 and 66. 
Figures 1 to 3 provide graphical evidence of the extent to which the country responses of 
prices and quantities deviate from the average reaction within the euro-area. 
A few features of the simulation results stand out. Table 1 shows that the amplitude 
of GDP fluctuations is different across countries, as witnessed by the range of values taken 
by the interim (20 periods) standard deviation of output, which is 5 times larger in Finland 
than in Belgium. Finland, Portugal, Greece and Italy appear to exhibit larger output volatility 
than their EMU partners: confidence bounds suggest that the discrepancy is statistically 
significant. Even if the interpretation of the measure of significance is open to question, these 
asymmetries cannot go unnoticed. 
A similar, though not identical pattern emerges from the correlation between country 
and aggregate movements, which is reported in the 4th column and plotted in Figure 1. A low 
coefficient indicates that the timing of the output response in a particular country diverges 
from that of the euro area as a whole. A country deviating from the aggregate is represented 
in Figure 1 by a point which is close to the centre of the circle. Again, Finland stands out as 
the EMU member whose response is furthest apart from the aggregate one, while the 
response for France differs little from the average response for the euro area. Overall, the 
correlation coefficients tend to be quite large, indicating that the differences in timing of the 
responses do not seem to be that large. With the exception of Finland, GDP responses are 
hump-shaped and reach a maximum between the second and the third year, so that the 
timing of the response is quite uniform across the whole EMU. 
                                                                          
5. The correlations reported in the tables are computed without excluding the country to which the coefficient refers from 
the euro area aggregate. This procedure induces an upward bias in the estimates for the larger countries. However, it 
could be argued that this is an appropriate measure as the monetary policy stance is based on developments at the 
euro area level and the cost of losing monetary independence is proportionate to the asymmetries existing between 
each country and the whole of the currency area. In the case of Germany, the adoption of the alternative solution of 
excluding the country from the area average would have generated some small differences.  
6. Country variances scaled by the aggregate variance have an F distribution; the correlation coefficients ρ , 
transformed into the quantity 2
1 2
−
−
nρ
ρ
, are distributed as a Student-t random variable. The distribution 
of these statistics is based on assumptions which are not likely to be satisfied in the present case. In particular, the 
hypothesis that both the variances and the covariances are computed on a random sample rather than on a set of 
estimated coefficients is unrealistic: since there is just one observation to estimate each impulse-response parameter, 
this is by no means an irrelevant assumption and puts inference procedures on shaky foundations. The results reported 
are therefore better viewed as suggesting some kind of metric which makes it possible to compare country results rather 
than as providing a reliable inference procedure to assess the statistical significance of the detected asymmetries. 
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More sizeable differences are apparent if one considers the volatility of consumer 
spending as a measure of the welfare effect of the monetary policy tightening. France is the 
country where the magnitude and timing of the consumption response is most in line with the 
aggregate one. The comparatively small response of consumption (in relation to the impact 
on output) in Belgium is indicative of a large degree of consumption smoothing. There is little 
sign of this in Portugal, Finland, Italy and Greece where movements in consumption are much 
larger. In Finland, the Netherlands and Belgium, household spending follows a pattern which 
is markedly different from the aggregate, as witnessed by the negative correlation coefficient. 
In the euro area, consumption reaches a trough between the second and the third year after 
the interest rate shock and starts increasing thereafter. However, in Finland and Belgium, the 
response of household spending is hump-shaped rather than U-shaped. 
Turning to nominal variables, the deflationary effect of the monetary policy shock 
on prices appears to be more evenly distributed across the euro-area than is the case 
for the aggregate demand components (Tables 3 and 4). Again, Finland behaves somewhat 
differently from the other countries. The timing and magnitude of the response of the 
consumption deflator are unlike that exhibited elsewhere, being more rapid and consistently 
larger. With regard to the consumption deflator, Austria also deviates somewhat from the 
average response, as shown in Figure 2, as inflation barely reacts to the policy stimulus and 
the maximum effect is visible in advance of that elsewhere. This behaviour is noteworthy since 
it is not matched by a similarly asymmetric response of output. 
Figure 4 combines the evidence concerning output and price responses. In order to 
highlight the importance of the degree of stickiness in the goods and labour markets in 
determining the effects of monetary policy, a number of indices, which are intended to 
represent the sacrifice ratio, are plotted7. The first is defined as the ratio between the size of 
the contraction in output and in the consumption deflator at the trough (sr1). The second uses 
the GDP rather than the consumption deflator (sr2), so as to separate the contribution of 
domestic channels of transmission. The figures for Finland point to relatively quick adjustment 
in goods and labour markets, which contributes to keeping the output cost of a monetary 
contraction well below the area average. Also Germany, Netherlands and Spain exhibit a 
balanced response of prices and quantities to the interest rate increase, while Portugal, 
Austria8 and Luxembourg appear to be characterised by values of the sacrifice ratio which are 
on average higher than those prevailing in the rest of the euro area. 
Figure 4 also presents an additional set of indices summarising the cost of adjusting 
to a monetary policy impulse, this time computed with reference to the variance in output and 
prices. The two series are the ratios between the variances of output and, alternatively, the 
consumption (sr3) and GDP deflators (sr4); the last one is the sacrifice ratio (sr5) computed 
in Van Els et al. (2001). These measures are broadly consistent with the earlier ones but 
suggest that, apart from the extreme cases (i.e. Germany and the Netherlands on the one 
hand; Austria, Portugal and Luxembourg on the other), an assessment of the distribution 
within the euro area of the cost of the policy action depends on the index which is chosen, 
which is tantamount to saying that the evidence is somewhat noisy. 
Cross country comparisons suggest that there are signs of asymmetries in monetary 
transmission in the euro area. While there is some evidence of differences in the way interest 
rate changes affect GDP, the differences seem more pronounced for consumption, where it 
seems that the extent of consumption smoothing varies between countries9. In addition, it 
                                                                          
7. A range of statistics is presented as any individual measure may not accurately reflect the degree of persistence of the 
effect of the policy shock and the extent to which the response to the shock is prompt or delayed. Hence we look for 
results which are robust across a range of measures. 
8. The high sacrifice ratio in Austria is due to a particularly weak response of prices rather than a strong response of 
output. 
9. One possible explanation for this evidence might be that the financial structure of the EMU members is still quite 
different and does not provide sufficient risk sharing mechanisms to households, who are therefore unable to adequately 
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appears that there is a group of countries whose economic structure is quite homogenous, 
but there are others where the transmission mechanism appears to work differently10. Unlike 
previous studies (see previous footnote), however, the WGEM results suggest that the size of 
the core has become larger, now including countries such as Italy and Spain, who have not 
usually been considered to be part of it. The detected differences are likely to be statistically 
significant, at least in a few cases, and in the next section we consider whether they have any 
significance from an economic standpoint. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
ensure against income fluctuations. Nevertheless, other recent evidence finds a weak response of consumption across 
euro area countries compared with the US [see Angeloni, Kashyap, Mojon and Terlizzese (2003)]. 
10. A number of other studies come to similar findings. Kouparitsas (1999), relying on VAR estimates, claims that Finland 
and Ireland form a sort of periphery within EMU and respond to monetary policy impulses differently from the other 
countries. Bean (1999) lists several studies which find asymmetries in the transmission mechanism and which, as the 
seminal paper by Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1993) does, distinguish a core and a periphery within the EU. 
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3 Are Cross-Country Differences in Monetary Policy Transmission Reliable? 
3.1 Comparing the WGEM Results with Business Cycle Properties 
We now examine the extent to which the cross-country differences in the transmission results 
reflect differences in business cycle fluctuations among euro area countries. An important 
caveat to keep in mind here is that business cycle differences may be caused by many other 
shocks hitting the economy apart from monetary policy. For example, cyclical swings in 
economic activity may also result from changes in the fiscal stance, commodity prices (oil), 
and the exchange rate. Nevertheless, business cycle differences remain potentially informative 
as long as cross-country differences in both the frequency and size of the other shocks and 
their impact on economic activity are sufficiently small.  
The cyclical behaviour of macroeconomic time series from euro area economies has 
been documented in the literature, see for instance, Angeloni and Dedola (1999) and Agresti 
and Mojon (2001). Generally speaking, although business cycles may gradually have become 
more synchronised across Europe, there appear to be substantial differences in terms of 
the volatility of these macroeconomic time series11, as shown in Table 512. This raises the 
possibility that these differences can be used to shed some light on the plausibility of 
the WGEM transmission results. With this aim, we examine a number of ‘hypotheses’. 
The first hypothesis assumes that in those countries where the volatility of private 
consumption is high, private consumption will react more swiftly and strongly to a change in 
the interest rate. As a result, the importance of the substitution channel may be enhanced in 
these cases (the channel decomposition in the central bank models will be explained in more 
detail in Section 3). The importance of the substitution channel (and of the other channels 
analysed below) is gauged with two measures. The impact of this channel on prices and 
output after one year (in absolute value) describes its importance in the short run. In addition, 
the cumulated absolute impact on prices and output after five years is used to trace the 
influence of the substitution channel in the long run. Figure 5 plots the volatility of private 
consumption against the short-run output effects. In line with the hypothesis, there appears to 
be a significant (at 84% level) positive relationship in the short-run, although such a 
relationship is not found in the long-run13. The short-run impact on prices is negligible in most 
countries and hence unrelated to the volatility of consumption14. Nevertheless, in the long-run, 
the impact on prices and the volatility of private consumption are significantly (at 95% level) 
correlated (see Figure 6). 
The second hypothesis assumes that, in those countries where the volatility of 
investment is higher, investment should be more responsive to changes in the interest rate, 
which in turn should lead the cost-of-capital channel to play a more dominant role in the 
monetary transmission process. Generally, this hypothesis is refuted by the data. However, if 
Greece and Luxembourg, countries for which investment is rather volatile but the 
cost-of-capital channel is of little importance, are dropped from the sample, a significant 
relationship (at 89% level) between the volatility of investment and the short run impact on 
output can be obtained (see Figure 7). 
                                                                          
11. The data used in this section are taken from a macroeconomic time series dataset, which was build for the 
Eurosystem Monetary Transmission Network of the Eurosystem, and which is described in detail in Agresti and 
Mojon (2001). Data on compensation per employee (which is used as a proxy for wages) and total employment (used in 
the calculation of labour productivity) are from BIS. When quarterly observations are unavailable, yearly observations are 
employed.  
12. Unconditional volatility measures have been computed as the standard deviation of year-on-year changes. We chose 
not to use a filter, like the HP- or Baxter-King filter, because some of the series are relatively short. 
13. Spearman’s rank order correlation coefficient is used to measure correlation between the two variables involved. 
P-values are obtained by linear interpolation of the exact small sample distribution. 
14. To save space, only graphs indicating a significant relationship are shown. 
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Lastly, we investigate the extent to which the impact on prices is related to the 
components of labour costs, in particular wages and labour productivity. The idea here is 
that, if wages or labour productivity is more volatile, labour costs may be potentially more 
responsive to changes in the monetary policy stance. More volatile labour cost components 
may then translate into a larger impact on prices from changes in the interest rate. Here, we 
only take into account the domestic channels of transmission. We can only get a significant 
relationship (at 92% level) between the volatility of wages and the long run impact on prices if 
we drop Ireland from the sample. Ireland has wages that are relatively volatile and domestic 
channels of transmission that are comparatively weak (see Figure 8)15.  
In sum, there appears to be some evidence that the transmission results correspond 
to cross-country differences in business cycles properties. In particular, the magnitude of the 
substitution channels seems to correspond to the volatility of private consumption.  
3.2 Comparing the WGEM Results with VAR evidence 
VAR models have been widely used to study the monetary transmission mechanism in euro 
area countries [see Mojon and Peersman (2001) and the references cited therein]. Hence, it 
is of interest to examine how the WGEM results compare with the impact on output and 
prices of monetary policy shocks calculated from VAR models. This comparison is however 
hampered by the fact that VAR models tend to differ in terms of variables included, 
the number of euro area countries covered and the identification strategy used. In the 
context of cross-country analyses in the euro area, two issues are particularly important. First, 
in VAR models both the sizes of the initial monetary policy shocks as well as the subsequent 
monetary policy responses usually differ across countries. By implication, even if the 
transmission mechanism is the same across countries, differences may show up as the result 
of differences in monetary policy reaction functions. Therefore, any meaningful comparison 
requires that similar monetary policy reaction functions and policy shocks be imposed 
across models. Second, particularly in the euro area the issue of spillover effects is important. 
The WGEM simulations allow for spillover effects, and, to be comparable, the VAR models 
should be analysed under a similar assumption. These factors significantly restrict the number 
of VAR model studies available in the literature that can potentially act as a benchmark16.  
One VAR study that does seem well suited to compare with the WGEM results is 
that of Peersman (2002). The WGEM simulations and the analysis by Peersman have two 
important points in common. First, both studies allow for spillover effects. In the latter this is 
done by simultaneously modelling euro area aggregates and macroeconomic variables from 
individual euro area countries, allowing for feedback from euro area aggregates to the country 
variables. Second, both studies present results for a common monetary policy shock across 
all euro area countries (this is Peersman's second simulation).  
However, there is also an important difference between the two studies. In 
the WGEM simulations, the monetary impulse is implemented as a sustained increase in the 
policy controlled interest rate by 100 basis points for two years, after which the policy rate 
immediately returns to baseline. In contrast, in Peersman's model, the short-term interest rate 
is initially raised by 30 basis points, after which the monetary policy reaction function, which is 
estimated implicitly in the VAR, is allowed to operate. Figure 9 provides the time profile of the 
short-term interest rate in both studies. 
To facilitate a comparison between the two studies, we therefore re-scale the time 
profile of the policy controlled interest rate in the WGEM in such a way as to make the time 
                                                                          
15. The fact that Ireland is an outlier here can to some extent be explained by its pattern of trade. A very large proportion 
of output is exported and a very large proportion of consumption is met by imports. Therefore, changes in domestic unit 
labour costs will not affect domestic consumer prices much, but will instead impact on competitiveness. In addition, the 
Irish retail sector has traditionally been heavily influenced by UK retailers’ pricing in sterling, so that domestic factors are 
also not important in affecting these prices. 
16. Due to a lack of information on the behaviour of the interest rate after the monetary policy shock, a proper 
comparison with the structural models results is made impossible in a number of  VAR studies. 
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profile identical to that of the short-term interest rate in Peersman’s VAR model. Implicitly, the 
assumption is made that the responses of GDP and prices in the WGEM simulations 
are (approximately) linear in the policy controlled interest rate17. However, it should be 
noted that the two sets of results are still not strictly comparable. Most importantly, in 
the WGEM simulations monetary policy is kept fixed, whereas in the VAR model monetary 
(and fiscal) authorities are allowed to respond to changes in the economic stance 
implicitly. This explains why the quantitative results may differ quite markedly. The main 
results can be summarised as follows (see Table 6 and Figure 10). First, using both 
models, the maximum impact on output is reached after approximately one year, although 
the size of the effects in the VAR exceed those of the WGEM simulations. This result is 
not specific to Peersman's VAR, but pertains to most VAR models surveyed in Mojon 
and Peersman (2001)18. Second, the maximum impact on output for each country is not 
significantly correlated across models, indicating that the cross-country differences 
obtained using the VAR model do not correspond to those generated in the WGEM 
simulations. This is in line with Mojon and Peersman's conclusion that –on the basis of a 
representative set of VAR studies– the literature does not point to any country within the euro 
area as experiencing either weaker or larger effects of monetary policy than the euro area 
average. Third, the maximum impact on prices are weakly positively correlated (at 63% level) 
across models, suggesting that the cross-country differences obtained using the two 
competing methodologies to some extent broadly match. Fourth, the maximum impact on 
inflation is attained much quicker in the WGEM simulations than in the VAR model. 
3.3 Comparing the Overall WGEM Results with Economic Structures 
We now seek to assess the plausibility of cross-country differences in monetary policy 
transmission in the euro area by examining how they correspond with the economic 
structures of EMU countries. We focus on asymmetries potentially arising in two areas: 
financial markets, which affect the transmission mechanism from interest rates to aggregate 
demand, and goods and labour markets, which determine the extent to which inflation 
reflects excess demand or supply. A third source of divergence across economies relates to 
preferences: countries may have differing attitudes to the variability of output and inflation, 
which translate into social insurance schemes which differ in terms of coverage and 
effectiveness19. We take up this issue first before proceeding to the analysis of the role of 
financial market or goods and labour market factors. 
While the role of financial structures and of price and wage flexibility is well 
understood, only a few studies have dealt with the links between social preferences and the 
                                                                          
17. The method of re-scaling used here is most easily explained by means of a simplified example. Assume that in 
study A (B) the interest rate is raised by s1 (σ1) % point in the first period and with s2 (σ2) % point in the second period. 
The response of output in study A (B) equals a1 (b1) in period one and a2 (b2) in period two. Clearly, a1 and a2 cannot 
be compared to b1 and b2 directly, since the monetary policy shocks differ across studies. To make responses 
comparable, the responses in study A are manipulated in the following way. First, we determine δ=(δ1, δ2) such that 
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. To make the interest rate profiles equal over the 
five year horizon, the matrices A and S and the vector δ have to be expanded to included s1 to s20, a1 to a20, and δ1 
to δ20.  
 
18. The behaviour of the euro exchange rate is a likely explanation for the responses of output and prices in the WGEM 
simulations being more limited. The WGEM simulations impose a theoretical UIP relationship, whereas in 
Peersman’s VAR the reaction of the euro exchange rate to a change in the interest rate is estimated from the data. The 
latter reaction appears to be more pronounced initially than the re-scaled UIP relationship. 
 
19. Bean (2000) and Cecchetti (1999) include discrepancies in social preferences among the sources of asymmetries in 
monetary policy transmission. 
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effectiveness of monetary policy20. One reason might be that the effects of social preferences 
on the economic structure are pervasive and it is therefore far from clear how to derive formal 
tests of their relevance in shaping the transmission mechanism. As a tentative solution, we 
focus on the fiscal policy framework, which is one of the features which may reflect the 
degree of aversion to income fluctuations. As regards fiscal policy, automatic stabilisers exert 
a damping effect on the cycle, and may therefore reflect more reliably the extent to which 
society accepts slower adjustment to shocks in order to avoid large swings in output and 
income21. 
In order to have an indicator of the degree of economic stabilisation stemming from 
automatic fiscal mechanisms, it is necessary to isolate the component of the budget balance 
which is linked to fluctuations in economic activity and to estimate the responsiveness 
of fiscal surpluses to changes in aggregate demand. The higher the elasticity to changes 
in the output gap, the more the fiscal budget moves counter-cyclically and acts as a 
stabiliser. The lower the response of net lending, the more fiscal policy amplifies the business 
cycle. Van den Noord (2000) provides estimates of the size of the automatic stabilisers for 
most OECD countries. He computes the cyclical element of the budget balance by 
subtracting from actual levels the structural components of tax revenues and expenditure, 
with the latter being defined as the levels corresponding to potential output. The elasticity of 
net lending to the output gap is therefore defined as the weighted average of the elasticity of 
the main budget items. Using the figures provided by Van den Noord22, it is possible to test 
whether there is a systematic relationship between the size of the automatic stabilisers and 
the ratio between the standard deviations of output and inflation. Figure 11 presents the 
relationship between the two variables for the EMU members and plots the straight line 
which best fits the cluster of points23. The curve is downward sloping, as expected. Therefore, 
those countries whose budget is more responsive to changes in the output gap, i.e. more 
contractionary in booms and more expansionary in recessions, are thought to dislike 
income volatility to a greater extent. Hence, they exhibit a lower ratio of the volatility of 
output with respect to that of inflation. The regression coefficient is statistically significant at 
the 5% confidence level, the corrected R square is slightly higher than 0.25 and the fit is fairly 
good, with the exception of Spain and Portugal. 
The evidence is admittedly weak and the interpretation is not straightforward. As 
witnessed by the statistical properties of the regression, the relationship between social 
preferences and the size of automatic stabilisers is quite noisy and, in addition, several factors 
which are likely to determine the relative size of output and inflation variability are not properly 
accounted for in the regression. Nevertheless, the evidence for this narrow measure of social 
preferences suggests that differences in these preferences do contribute to explaining some 
of the observed differences in the transmission mechanism. 
                                                                          
20. De Grauwe (1995) asserts that two arguments, both related to time inconsistency, may be used to explain how 
divergent preferences may be a source of disagreement over the conduct of monetary policy. The first is the usual 
Barro-Gordon claim, that policymakers have incentives to indulge in surprise inflation in order to push activity above 
potential. The second relies on the inflation-tax revenues which the government can reap by reducing the real value of 
outstanding nominally-denominated public debt. Bean (2000) claims that these arguments are irrelevant for countries in 
which the central bank is independent. Instead, he suggests that social preferences matter in the choice of the optimal 
trade-off between output and inflation variability and are therefore responsible for the different degree of activism of 
central banks in responding to inflationary shocks. 
21. Van den Noord (2000) claims that, over the 1990s, automatic fiscal stabilisers have worked to dampen cyclical 
fluctuations in the average OECD country by about 25 per cent. This results is due to the rise in taxes and government 
transfers, which have increased significantly as a share of total income in most OECD countries over the past 40 years. 
Average results however, should be interpreted with caution, since data show considerable cross-country variation. 
22. See Van den Noord (2000), Table A.1, page 19. No figures for Luxembourg are provided. 
23. The approach usually taken in the literature is somewhat different and tends to relate social preferences to the 
behaviour of the central bank. Most studies focus on the coefficients of estimated interest rate rules and use them to 
infer the form of the central bank’s welfare function. Evidence is in general inconclusive, since, as stressed in 
Bean (2000), under plausible specifications of the economy, the volatility trade-off is quite sharply curved and there is a 
wide range of relative weights on output variability vis-a-vis inflation variability that can generate rather similar optimal 
points on the volatility frontier. Even sharply different preferences do not result in very different policy choices. 
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We now turn to the role of the financial structure in shaping the way in which the 
economy responds to monetary policy impulses. Capital markets and the banking system 
determine the speed and the extent to which policy impulses are transmitted to longer-term 
interest rates, equity prices and the exchange rate. The net asset position of households, 
firms and the government sector then determines the impact on aggregate demand of the 
new combination of asset yields. The presence of imperfections in financial markets and the 
associated existence of a credit channel, by amplifying the response to the initial change in 
interest rates, provides additional leverage to the policy action24. 
There is a lack of hard evidence concerning the way in which the financial structure 
affects the transmission mechanism. The extent to which credit constraints bite on 
households and the size of the external finance premium which is charged on small firms 
can not be easily measured. Accordingly, even in the literature no clear-cut conclusions 
are available. Cecchetti (1999) analyses the factors affecting the strength of the monetary 
transmission mechanism, focusing on the importance of small banks, the health of the 
banking sector and the availability of alternative sources of financing. He finds that the 
countries in which the lending channel is expected to be strongest have the largest sacrifice 
ratios and show the most sizeable impact of interest rate movements on output. He then 
finds that cross-country differences in the financial structure have their source in the strength 
of shareholder and creditor rights and in the rigor with which these rights are enforced. 
Mihov (2001) replicates Cecchetti’s analysis and does not find much evidence supporting the 
relevance of the financial structures. On the contrary, he finds that industrial structure is a 
much more powerful factor in explaining the non-uniform responses of the euro-area 
countries. However, Bean (1999) contrasts the transmission mechanism in the UK and in the 
rest of western Europe and finds that, the high value of households’ indebtedness and the 
large share of private sector debt which is at variable rates, account for the larger than 
average response of UK output to a monetary policy shock. 
Table 7 reports a few statistics highlighting selected characteristics of the financial 
structures of the EU-12 countries25. These variables are compared with the cost of the policy 
tightening as measured by the sacrifice ratio26. The table shows the results obtained by 
means of univariate regressions27. The evidence is, to say the least, mixed. Market 
capitalisation, as a share of GDP, helps to discriminate between bank-oriented and 
market-oriented financial structures. It is expected to be higher wherever capital markets are 
developed and well functioning and where the cost of adjusting to a monetary policy shock is 
moderate. Market capitalisation is indeed low in Portugal and Austria, where the sacrifice ratio 
is relatively large, and high in France and the Netherlands, where the effects of the monetary 
shock are moderate. Germany and Finland do not fit convincingly into this story, and Greece 
is completely at odds with it. The size of MFI loans to firms  (as a percentage of GDP), which 
may reflect the extent to which credit constraints bite on investment spending, does appear 
to have some explanatory power, especially when the share of loans which are short-term is 
considered. 
                                                                          
24. A credit channel exists when, due to information asymmetries and moral hazard problems, banks and non-financial 
firms are not uniformly affected by monetary policy actions, since small units have limited access to financial markets. 
Macroeconometric models are not well-suited for gauging the relevance of the credit channel in monetary transmission, 
since usually they do not distinguish firms according to size and health. 
25. Homogeneous data are hard to find for all countries and in most cases statistics are available only for a subset of 
countries, which explains the low figures for the regression degrees of freedom. 
26. As in Van Els et al. (2001), in the present study the sacrifice ratio has been computed focusing on the response of 
the unemployment rate and the GDP deflator in the first five years of the simulation experiment. The following additional 
assumptions has been used: (i) the sacrifice ratio is computed with reference to domestic channels only; (ii) the 
cumulated unemployment loss is computed for the first j* years, where j* is the year in which the unemployment rate 
reaches a peak; (iii) the cumulated reduction in inflation is computed for the first k* years, where k* is the year in which 
the level of the GDP deflator reaches a trough. 
27. In addition to univariate regression, the Spearman rank order correlation coefficient has also been computed and the 
results are available upon request from the authors. All in all, the two methods provide very similar evidence. The use of 
regression methods facilitates comparisons with the available literature on monetary transmission within the euro area. 
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The concentration of the banking sector provides some help in understanding the 
sources of asymmetries in the transmission mechanism. Focusing on concentration may be 
appropriate if one assumes that the larger the average size of banks, the higher their ability to 
attract funds from capital markets and the lower their exposition to a credit squeeze. The 
Herfindahl index28 and the market share of the five largest banks do not contribute to 
explaining the size of the sacrifice ratio, while the variables related to the number of credit 
institutions operating in the euro-area countries do. Indeed, the smaller the average size of 
banks, the larger the sacrifice ratio. The variable measuring the penetration of credit 
institutions from countries outside the euro area has a negative sign. This would be justified if 
these banks were less affected by monetary policy shocks due to their ability to exploit 
alternative sources of funding. Looking at non-financial firms, the results tend to be less 
informative. The sacrifice ratio seems to be positively related to the number of firms issuing 
shares and inversely related to their average capitalisation, which is inconsistent with the 
notion that, the higher the information asymmetry, the lower the capacity of enterprises to 
access non-bank finance. The size of firms, as proxied by the number of employees in their 
payrolls, is not significant. All in all, even allowing for the uncertainty due to the noise present 
in the data, the differences in the financial structure do not seem able to explain all of the 
observed asymmetries in the transmission mechanism.  
It is widely accepted that most asymmetries in monetary transmission are to be 
found in the working of labour and goods markets. While there are a huge number of studies 
directed to understanding the role played by the former, only a handful of papers deal with the 
latter, and most of them focus on the size of the manufacturing sector, paying brief attention 
to issues like customer-supplier relationships and inertia in nominal price setting. There are 
two aspects of the labour and goods markets that are of particular interest in understanding 
how costly it is to adjust to a monetary policy shock: nominal inertia and real rigidity. The 
higher they are, the less reactive are prices and wages to changes in the output gap and the 
less effective is interest rate policy. It is well known that nominal inertia –at least with respect 
to wages– is lower in Europe and higher in the US, while the opposite is true for real (wage) 
rigidities. However, it is not well documented how both of them are distributed across 
countries in the euro area29. Given the lack of available estimates, both kind of rigidities are 
measured only indirectly. It is assumed that nominal inertia and real price-wage rigidity are 
functions of a small number of variables which, by shaping workers’ and employers’ 
behaviour, ultimately determines the size of both parameters. Real rigidity inversely depends 
on the responsiveness of the price and wage mark-ups to product and labour market 
slackness. The former is related to market contestability and depends on the extent of state 
control, the incidence of regulations and the size of barriers to entrepreneurship and trade. 
The latter is affected by the institutional features which maintain a high degree of bargaining 
power for the insiders and which reduce the degree of centralisation and coordination of 
wage bargaining. 
Table 8 shows the results of regressing the sacrifice ratio (sr5), assumed to measure 
the cost of adjusting after a monetary shock30, on proxies of both nominal inertia and real 
rigidity. Given the small number of available observations, regressions are univariate. The first 
rows are aimed at assessing the importance of product market flexibility. The openness of the 
economy and the weight of the manufacturing sector in total value added provide proxies of 
the share of the economy which is exposed to international competition and are therefore 
used along with the other variables, which are more directly related to the degree of flexibility 
                                                                          
28. A measure of concentration of production in an industry, calculated as the sum of the squares of market shares for 
each firm. 
29. Layard et al. (1991) report estimates for both parameters for most of the current EMU members (9 out of 12), but the 
figures are by now somewhat outdated, given the extensive reforms in labour market institutions which have taken place 
in the last decade. 
30. The sacrifice ratio is defined as in Van Els et al. No figure for Luxembourg is available. 
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of product markets. Regression results indicate that neither variable seems to be significantly 
related to the size of the sacrifice ratio; in addition both have the wrong sign31. The 
coefficients on the dimension of the barriers to trade and investment and employment 
protection legislation are significant and correctly signed. The latter turns out to be relevant in 
explaining the high sacrifice ratio in Portugal and, at the other extreme, the low one in 
Germany. The other variables (nominal wage inertia, the index of product market flexibility, 
state control, barriers to trade and investment and economic regulation) are either insignificant 
or wrongly signed and so are those related to the wage mark-up. 
 
3.4 Comparing the Channel Decomposition from WGEM Results with Economic 
Structures 
We now turn to explaining the channel decomposition in the WGEM Monetary Transmission 
Results. The approach taken is to compare the pattern of results for each channel with a 
number of prior judgements based on theoretical or empirical considerations. Six channels of 
transmission are identified, at least some of which are present in all the participating models. 
In each case we describe the channel and consider what factors may influence its 
magnitude32:  
— The substitution-effect-in-consumption channel. The real interest rate represents 
the relative cost of present versus future consumption. Following a policy tightening, 
it becomes more rewarding to delay consumption and increase saving, which exerts 
a negative impulse on the current level of economic activity. The effects of this 
channel on output would be expected to depend on the proportion of GDP 
accounted by consumers’ expenditure and the sensitivity of consumption to changes 
in interest rates. The latter may be linked to the financial strategies adopted by 
consumers (e.g. whether they feel the need to maintain precautionary balances) and 
the financial conditions they face (e.g. whether they face credit constraints). 
— The cost-of-capital channel. The rise in the real interest rate is reflected in the 
real cost of capital. The optimal capital-output ratio falls and the pace of capital 
accumulation slows accordingly. A similar mechanism operates for investment in 
housing and for inventories accumulation. The rental cost of durable goods moves in 
parallel with the cost of capital and also causes a contraction in consumer 
spending33. The magnitude of this channel might be expected to depend on the 
financial structure and the conditions faced by firms. For instance, effects may be 
larger in countries where firms are more indebted or where they borrow on 
short-term interest rates. As with consumers, firms may also face credit constraints, 
and these may be more important for smaller firms with less easy access to capital 
markets. Finally, industrial structure may matter as some industries may be more 
affected by changes in interest rates due to either their capital requirements or the 
nature of the goods they produce (e.g. durables, non-durables, intermediate or 
investment goods). 
                                                                          
31. The correct sign of the share of manufacturing in value added is actually not clear. Mihov (2001) assumes that 
manufacturing firms are more exposed to financing problems and are more heavily damaged by the credit squeeze 
following a monetary tightening. His prediction is therefore that the size of the manufacturing sector is positively related 
to the output loss engendered by an increase in interest rates. Dedola and Lippi (2000) find that the industry structure 
matters, because the sectors producing investment and durable goods –which are part of manufacturing– are more 
sensitive to changes in the monetary policy stance. In both cases, the presumption is that the correlation between the 
sacrifice ratio and the share of the manufacturing sector is positive and indeed Mihov finds that this variable has a non-
negligible explanatory power, when the cumulated output loss rather than the sacrifice ratio is used as the endogenous 
variable. Notice however, that the sample used by Mihov (2001) excludes a few EMU countries, but includes the US, 
the UK, Japan and Canada, which means that his results are not entirely comparable to those presented in this paper. 
32. As discussed in Section 3, in some models additional channels are singled out: a price-monetary channel is included 
in the one of the Bundesbank; an expectation channel is present in the Italian model. 
33. Since most econometric models used in the experiment do not distinguish between consumption of durables and 
non-durables to allow comparisons, the response to the monetary policy shock of durables spending has been allocated 
not to the cost-of-capital channel, but to the substitution-effect channel. 
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— The income and cash-flow channel. A rise in financial yields increases the 
disposable income of net lenders and worsens the cash flows of net borrowers. The 
importance of the cash-flow channel is likely to be linked to the financial structure of 
the economy. It may also depend on the relative propensity of borrowers and lenders 
to spend. 
— The wealth channel. A rise in the cost of borrowing reduces the discounted value 
of future expected payoffs of physical and financial assets. The market value of 
households’ net wealth adjusts to incorporate capital losses and household 
spending falls accordingly. The impact of the wealth channel would be expected to 
be affected by the magnitude of household wealth and the sensitivity of consumers’ 
expenditure to changes in wealth. 
— The exchange rate channel. In most models of exchange rate determination, a 
monetary policy tightening leads to an appreciation of the currency. A stronger 
exchange rate causes a fall in export volumes and an increase in consumer 
spending, induced by the positive income effect which follows an appreciation. It 
also yields a fall in the price level, directly since it reduces the cost of imported goods 
and the size of the mark-up and indirectly since it worsens the competitive position 
of domestic firms and hence net exports. For both the price and output effects it 
would be expected that the proportion of trade outside the euro area, which will thus 
be affected by a change in the euro exchange rate, would help to explain the pattern 
of results. The extent and the speed of the pass-through of changes in the exchange 
rate into trade and domestic prices will also be important. This will depend on the 
pricing strategies of importers and the extent to which they ‘price-to-market’ or 
passively accept exchange rate induced price changes. 
— The spillover channel. Models were initially operated in ‘isolated’ mode without 
intra-euro area spillovers. Therefore, at the outset no assumptions were made about 
any change in foreign variables due to the simulation that might feed back into the 
domestic results. However, such effects were taken into account in a second round 
through an exchange of results between modellers whereby the results of the first 
run of all models in isolated mode were incorporated in each model. The variables 
affected were export demand and competitors’ export and import prices. It would be 
expected that the extent to which countries trade within the euro area would be an 
important factor in determining the magnitude of the spillover channel. 
 
Table 9 provides an overview on which of the channels of monetary policy 
transmission are present in each of the models. The substitution, cost of capital, exchange 
rate and spillover channels are present in all models. However, the cash flow/income channel 
is not present in Greece or Ireland, whilst the wealth channel is only present in half of the 
models.  As is discussed later in this note, the limited number of results for the wealth channel 
makes it difficult to identify the factors affecting the magnitude of this channel. 
For each channel we report the average impacts on output and prices in the first two 
years. In principle any horizon could have been chosen, but two years reflected the timing of 
the change in monetary policy. As an alternative, results have also been derived using a 
horizon of five years, although these are not shown. Broadly speaking, most of the following 
results still hold with a five-year horizon. 
3.4.1 DOMESTIC CHANNELS 
Substitution in Consumption 
The substitution-effect-in-consumption channel exists in all models (Table 10 gives more 
details on the interest rate effects on consumers’ expenditure). In most cases consumption is 
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directly affected by changes in the short-term interest rate, although in the case of Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal it is the real short-term rate. In  Spain and the Netherlands, consumption 
is affected by the long-term interest rate and in the case of Germany and Luxembourg it is the 
real long-term rate. In Italy, short-term interest rates affect the consumption of durables whilst 
long-term rates affect the consumption of non-durables.  The magnitude of the substitution 
channel is given in Figure 12. Average output effects in the first two years are largest in 
Greece (-0.25%) and Portugal (-0.2%), whereas in Belgium there is a small positive output 
effect. Price effects are generally much smaller, with the largest effects reported in Austria and 
Portugal (-0.02%) with a small positive effect observed in Italy. 
As highlighted earlier, the output effects would be expected to depend on 
the proportion of GDP accounted for by consumers’ expenditure and the sensitivity of 
consumption to changes in interest rates. To examine the first issue we have plotted the 
output effects against the share of consumers’ expenditure in total GDP (Figure 13). This 
shows a clear relationship with a greater consumption share being associated with a larger 
substitution effect on output.  
As discussed, the sensitivity of consumer spending to changes in interest rates may 
be expected to depend on the extent to which consumers’ feel the need to make 
precautionary savings and the extent to which they face credit constraints. A rise in interest 
rates would increase the return to precautionary balances and, if it led to a worsening in 
economic conditions, would also be expected to increase the need for such balances, 
inducing additional saving and a fall in consumer spending. The need for precautionary 
savings may be higher for the self-employed who would be expected to enjoy less 
employment security than permanent employees. In addition, as the self-employed are less 
likely to have a regular and reliable pattern of income, they may more readily encounter credit 
constraints than permanent employees. A rise in interest rates may increase the number of 
credit-constrained consumers as collateral declines and may worsen short-term income 
prospects. As is shown in Figure 13, there is a reasonably clear relationship between the 
self-employment share and the output effects of the substitution channel. In those countries 
where self-employment is more prevalent, the output effects of the substitution channel are 
larger in magnitude. 
Similar arguments could be advanced with respect to certain labour market 
institutions. For instance trade unions might be expected to reduce the likelihood of 
employees facing significant wage cuts or facing redundancy. If people do lose their jobs, a 
generous unemployment benefit system would reduce the income loss from redundancy. 
Therefore, both institutions might be expected to be associated with a lower need for 
precautionary savings. As shown in Figure 14, there are some signs that the magnitude of the 
substitution channel is diminished in those countries where these institutions are stronger. 
 
Cost of Capital 
The cost-of-capital channel is present in all models but there are differences between the 
various models in the way this channel is incorporated. As Table 10 reveals, in many cases 
the link between interest rates and business investment is via the capital stock. A change in 
interest rates affects the user costs of capital, which affects the desired capital stock and 
thereby investment. Because of adjustment costs, investment can only gradually bring the 
actual capital stock to its desired level. Figure 15 gives details of the magnitude of the cost of 
capital channel. Italy is the country with the strongest reported cost of capital impact on 
output (-0.18) followed by Portugal (-0.15), with Luxembourg reporting the smallest effects. 
The largest impact on prices is also observed in Italy and Portugal (-0.025), with Belgium 
reporting a small rise in prices. 
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As discussed, the magnitude of the cost of capital channel might be expected to 
depend on the financial structure and the conditions faced by firms and the industrial 
structure. To consider the first of these we have examined the links between the results and 
the proportion of firms’ financing which is short-term, the size of firms’ interest payments and 
the proportion of small firms. No role is found for the proportion of firms using 
short-term-financing, but as Figure 16 shows, there is some relationship between the 
magnitude of non-financial firms’ interest payments and the cost of capital channel, with 
greater interest payments being associated with a more influential cost of capital channel. 
However this relationship is largely driven by one observation (Italy)34. A relationship is also 
found between the share of small firms and the output effects of the cost of capital channel. 
As discussed, the argument here is that small firms may be subject to greater capital market 
frictions than larger ones and more affected by the credit channel. Finally, as was highlighted 
in the Introduction, it might be expected that the magnitude of the cost of capital channel 
might be affected by industrial structure. For instance, it may be the case that manufacturing, 
particularly of durables and investment goods, would be more significantly affected than other 
sectors. As shown in the figure, there appears to be some relationship with a larger 
manufacturing sector being associated with a larger magnitude of the cost of capital channel. 
It is clear that the figures presented in Figure 16 can explain only a limited amount of 
the cross-country variation in the cost of capital channel. It may well be the case that the 
results are driven by country-specific factors, such as traditional patterns of behaviour in the 
finance industry. For example, in Germany there is a tradition of ‘relationship banking’ 
entailing close ties between corporations and banks, such that changes in the cost of capital 
have a relatively small impact. Further evidence on this is documented in Ehrmann and 
Worms (2001). 
 
Income 
The combined cash flow/income channel exists in all models except in those for Greece and 
Ireland. The impact of this channel will depend on the financial position of households and 
firms at the time of the policy action35. The magnitude of the income channel is shown in 
Figure 17. Portugal and Finland report negative income channel effects on output in the first 
two years, whilst Belgium, Spain, France and Italy report positive effects. Only in the case of 
Finland (negative) and Italy (positive) do these output effects translate into any noticeable price 
effects in the first two years. 
The magnitude of the income effect may depend on the net amount of interest 
receipts by households and also household’s exposure to interest changes through 
short-term debt. The first chart in Figure 18 plots net interest receipts as a proportion of net 
income against the magnitude of the income channel. It does appear to be the case that 
where net interest receipts are negative, the income channel exerts a negative effect on 
output, and where net interest receipts are positive, the output effects are also positive. In 
Italy, the positive contribution of the income channel reflects the fact that households are net 
creditors, and raise consumption in response to the increase in interest payments received on 
holdings of government debt. In Finland and the Netherlands, households are net debtors. 
Hence, the income channel tends to reinforce the drop in output in these countries.  
The second chart links the proportion of financing that is short-term with the 
magnitude of the output effects from the income channel. It does appear to be the case that, 
where more household borrowing is short-term the income channel is more negative 
(for example in Portugal). 
 
                                                                          
34. In fact this firms’ net interest payments measure may be more directly related to the income channel than to how 
credit constraints affect the cost of capital channel. 
35. The change in interest payments sums up to zero, when taking into account the rest of the world.  
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Wealth 
The wealth channel is not present in the models for Austria, Germany, Greece, Spain, 
France and Portugal. Changes in wealth are caused by (cumulated) changes in asset 
holdings (M3, bonds, shares and net foreign assets) as well as by valuation effects. As 
to the latter, asset prices are endogenous in the models for Finland (house prices), 
Italy (house and bond) and the Netherlands (house, share and bond prices). In the models for 
Finland and the Netherlands, wealth not only affects consumption directly, but also residential 
investment through changes in house prices.  
Figure 19 gives details of the magnitude of the wealth channel, although the results 
are rather sparse as only Italy, the Netherlands, Ireland and Finland report any noticeable 
wealth effects in the first two years. Wealth effects on output are negative in Italy and the 
Netherlands and positive in Ireland36. The results for Finland give no perceptible impact on 
average output in the first two years and a tiny (positive) impact on prices. 
To examine these wealth channel results we have plotted the output effects against 
the market capitalisation as a % of GDP (Figure 20). The idea here is, that countries with a 
more significant equity market may report more significant wealth effects. As can be seen 
from the chart, no clear relationship is observed which is not too surprising given the paucity 
of the results from the wealth channel. 
The weakness of the wealth channel is perhaps surprising, given the increased 
importance of stocks and bonds in portfolios of households and firms. One reason why 
wealth effects may be moderate, even when explicitly accounted for in the models, relates to 
the fact that, by assumption, the interest rate shock is a rather short-lived so that forward 
looking long-term interest rates respond only partially, limiting the impact on asset prices. 
Nevertheless, for those countries that consider  endogenous asset valuation effects, the total 
real effects (not only the wealth effect) of the monetary disturbance  seems to be more 
relevant (see section 3.2). 
3.4.2 FOREIGN CHANNELS 
Exchange Rate 
The exchange rate channel directly feeds into the euro-price of oil and other commodities 
(involving the euro-dollar exchange rate) and the foreign prices of other goods and services 
(involving the effective exchange rates). The change in import and competitors’ prices in euro 
initiates a change in domestic prices, which will spread through the price and wage system. 
The importance of the exchange rate channel in each of the countries is given in Figure 21. As 
the charts indicate, the largest price effects are recorded in Finland with an average fall 
of 0.4% in the first 2 years. In contrast, the smallest price effects are observed in Luxembourg 
with an average fall of 0.015% over this period. However, the distribution of output effects is 
rather different. In this case the largest output effects are recorded in Germany (-0.225%) and 
the smallest in Portugal (-0.02%). 
A number of factors may underlie these results. Campa and González-Mínguez 
(2002) find that openness and sectoral composition are relevant determinants of differences in 
the exchange rate pass through in euro area countries. Hence, for both the price and output 
effects it would be expected that the proportion of trade outside the euro area, which will thus 
be affected by a change in the euro exchange rate, should help to explain the pattern of 
results, at least in the short run. However, in neither case are the results supportive of the 
notion that trade patterns can explain the exchange rate channel. A number of additional 
factors maybe at work. In the case of the effects on domestic prices, the extent and the 
speed of the pass-through will also be important. This will depend on the pricing strategies of 
importers and the extent to which they ‘price-to-market’ or passively accept exchange rate 
                                                                          
36. In the latter case this is due to the deflator attached to the wealth variable (the consumption deflator), being more 
affected than the nominal wealth variable and leading to a rise in real wealth.  
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induced price changes. For instance it might be expected that changes in the price of raw 
materials and fuels, which are determined on international markets, would be passed through 
into domestic prices. If this was the case, then a high share of such items in total imports may 
be reflected in a larger change in domestic prices, following the change in the exchange rate. 
As shown in Figure 22, this relationship appears to hold for the price effects of the exchange 
rate channel. 
In relation to the output effects of the change in exchange rate it might be expected 
that the presence of multinational firms might lead to larger effects from the exchange rate 
channel as such firms may be more easily able to relocate production. To proxy this effect, 
the figure plots the relationship between the share of large firms and the output effects of the 
exchange rate channel. There appears to be a weak relationship, with larger firms being 
associated with a larger output effect from the change in the exchange rate.  
 
Spillovers 
The magnitude of the spillover channel is reported in Figure 23. Finland is the country with the 
largest impact on prices via the spillover channel (-0.075%) whilst Germany and Ireland report 
minimal price effects. In terms of output, the largest effects are reported in Belgium (-0.1%) 
and Luxembourg (-0.08%). 
The magnitude of the spillover channel on prices may depend on how import 
price changes feed through into domestic prices. This will depend, at least in part, on how 
important intra-euro area imports are in relation to GDP. Figure 24 relates intra-EU-12 
imports (of goods) as a % of GDP to the magnitude of the spillover effects on prices. A slight 
relationship is observed (whereby more intra EU-12 trade is associated with a larger price 
effect from the spillover channel). However, these results are greatly affected by one outlier 
(Finland), and if this is removed, a stronger relationship is observed. 
As regards the output effects, we have linked these to total intra-EU-12 trade as a 
proportion of GDP. Here, a clear relationship is observed, with greater intra-EU-12 trade 
being associated with larger spillover effects on output.  
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4 Model-Based Explanations 
Thus far we have examined the plausibility of the WGEM monetary policy transmission results 
with respect to other evidence. In this section we adopt a different approach of looking for 
differences in modelling strategy as even the same economy may be characterised by 
alternative models. Therefore, it is also important to analyse the distinct features of model 
design across the macroeconometric models used for the monetary policy experiment. 
Ultimately, it would be an empirical task to decide which is the best representation of the 
statistical regularities and the structural features of a single economy. The classic way to do 
that is to compare the fit of the estimated models. However, in this section we abstract from 
differences in results due to economic differences and study the key features of the models 
and what the implications may be for the differences in the simulation results. 
Most models use the marginal conditions that arise from a well-defined supply-side 
model to determine the long-run equilibrium conditions. These conditions are consistent with 
the neoclassical equilibrium properties whereby transitory nominal shocks are neutral in the 
long run.  Therefore, the main differences in the case of a temporary monetary shock should 
be reflected in the dynamic adjustment of the variables to their long-run equilibrium. Thus, we 
will concentrate on four properties of the models with respect of the mechanism of 
propagation of shocks: (1) The treatment of expectations; (2) The measurement of wealth 
valuation; (3) The determinants of the labour market variables and (4) The existence of specific 
monetary and expectational channels in some country models37. 
4.1 Treatment of Expectations 
Modern quantitative models are explicit about how the expectations of the future value of 
relevant variables are solved by agents to form their optimal decision plans. The 
macroeconometric models whose results are reviewed here are used not only for forecasting 
purposes but also to address relevant policy questions. This has led some model proprietors 
to attempt to incorporate forward-looking expectations into their structures. In Table 11 we 
see that fewer than half of the central bank models have incorporated some type of 
forward-looking behaviour into agents’ decisions. They are Germany, Italy, Belgium, Finland 
and the two models for the euro area, the Area Wide Model (AWM) and the Euro area 
Dynamic General Equilibrium (EDGE). The remaining models implicitly assume that the 
formation of expectations is captured by current and lagged values of the observable 
variables. The way this is usually done, is by fitting the unrestricted lags of those variables to 
the data when estimating single behavioural equations. 
Three models, those for Germany, Italy and the AWM, consider the expectations on 
the aggregate price or wage equation and/or on the price of specific asset markets. These 
are usually long-term interest rates and exchange rates. Since the simulation exercise we are 
considering already incorporates an exogenous path for these two financial variables 
consistent with the expectational theory of interest rates and the UIP, that aspect of 
forward-lookingness will not make a difference with respect to the models that are completely 
backward-looking. 
In Table 12 we present the key features of the remaining three models (i.e. Belgium, 
Finland and EDGE) that are more fully forward-looking. The magnitude and shape of 
the responses of all the nominal and real variables will be affected since these models 
do not consider expectations in an isolated way. The theoretical foundations that give rise 
to the presence of expected values on the agents' decision functions are in the spirit of 
                                                                          
37. Other mechanisms of propagation such as the existence of financial frictions or the modelling of the intertemporal 
decisions of the public sector are potentially important, but are beyond the scope of this analysis. 
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Blanchard's (1985) stochastic lifetime approach and profit-maximising firms with some 
monopoly power. This gives consumption and investment decision rules that are a function of 
relevant current and expected variables. The models for Belgium and Finland are the only 
ones that have been estimated and are used both for projection as well as for simulation 
exercises. On the other side of the spectrum is the EDGE model that has been calibrated and 
is mainly used for policy analyses. 
The most relevant characteristic of the two estimated models is that they combine 
model-consistent expectations with backward-looking expectations that arise when the 
optimal decisions of the agents are embedded in some type of optimal adjustment plan 
problem. The main reason for replacing the usual rational expectations dynamics by these ad 
hoc dynamics is to improve the goodness of fit of the models. This is probably why there are 
no models with purely model-consistent expectations used for forecasting purposes. A novel 
feature of the Belgian model is that the expectations needed to perform the estimations and 
simulations are consistent with those provided by an auxiliary VAR model38.  
As is shown by the simulation results in Table 13, the two estimated models have 
some special features. In Finland, the response of prices and output to a monetary shock 
reaches a maximum value within the first year. Moreover, the magnitude of this contractionary 
shock in the first year is higher than in any other country39. Belgium has relatively moderate 
real and nominal effects but its maximum output response is during the second year and 
almost disappears in the fourth year, whereas the maximum price response occurs in the 
third year. It is not surprising that the shape of the Belgium's responses was found to be 
consistent with those found in the VAR literature (see Section 1) since an estimated VAR has 
been used to fit the dynamics of the model. 
In any case, it seems that a common shared property of both estimated models is 
the fast real and nominal transmission of the monetary shock. This is in spite of the 
classification of Finland and Belgium as having a small output effect on average compared 
with the aggregate of the euro area models [see Van Els et al. (2001)].  That result also holds 
with other macroeconometric models. For example, McAdam and Morgan (2001) find that the 
inclusion of forward looking elements in the NIGEM model tends to increase the initial impact 
and to hasten the return to baseline values of the macroeconomic variables after a monetary 
shock. 
A similar pattern can be seen in the calibrated model for the euro area (EDGE). This 
can be seen by comparing the results of the monetary shock with the EDGE model, which is 
forward-looking, and the AWM, which is backward-looking40. In the first case, the maximum 
output effect occurs during the first year of the simulation period whereas in the AWM it 
occurs in the third year. Similarly, in the EDGE model the greater changes in prices occur in 
the first three years whereas in the AWM they are equally distributed over the five years of the 
simulation period. 
4.2 Treatment of Wealth Valuation 
Another source of differences in macroeconometric modelling that may be relevant for 
understanding the simulation results is how wealth is treated in the models. As we can see 
from Table 14, most countries' models have a wealth variable (except Austria, Greece, France 
and Portugal) defined as the sum of the financial and non-financial assets owned by 
private agents. Those models that have a wealth variable include it jointly with real disposable 
income to determine the long-term trend of consumption. The Belgian model, given its 
forward-looking character, can also incorporate human wealth measured as the present value 
                                                                          
38. This estimation method is discussed for example by Brayton and Tinsley (1995), and has also been considered by 
the FRB/US econometric model. 
39. This was also discussed in Section 1. 
40. Since the path of the effective nominal exchange rates is very similar, but not equal, in both models we do a 
qualitative comparison. 
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of future wage income. Still, even in this case, current income is a long-run determinant of 
total consumption since the model assumes the existence of liquidity-constrained consumers. 
An exception is the model of Ireland which does not include an income variable as a 
determinant of long-run consumption; the latter being determined by wealth alone. 
Although there is a wide range of assets to be considered, the most 
common definition includes government debt, the stock of capital and the net foreign 
asset position (i.e. Ireland, Luxemburg, Spain, EDGE and the AWM). Some models 
also include in the financial assets definition real balances or liquid assets (i.e. Italy, 
Finland and the Netherlands). Finally, housing is also considered in the models of Belgium, 
Italy, the Netherlands and Finland. Nevertheless, Table 14 also shows that there are only a 
limited number of countries that have modelled the determinants of prices in stock markets or 
housing markets. For those models that consider asset prices as endogenous variables, they 
are valued as the discounted present value of future dividends. In the case of 
backward-looking models (i.e. Italy and the Netherlands) this is usually approximated by the 
real (long-term) interest rates, some measure of current profitability and a time trend. 
Table 15 analyses the implications of modelling asset prices in terms of the monetary 
policy simulation. We report both the output effect and the contribution of wealth to that 
output effect for the three euro area economies that incorporate the market price valuation of 
their wealth and for other three euro area models that report some wealth effect but that only 
consider changes in asset holdings. From Table 15 we conclude that the contribution of the 
wealth effect to the monetary transmission seems to be more relevant in those countries for 
which changes in wealth valuation are endogenous. This is a relevant channel of monetary 
transmission since changes in interest rates will affect the price of those assets, incrementing 
the wealth effect on consumption. 
4.3 Labour Market Equations 
A common characteristic of all the models is that they assume some form of imperfectly 
competitive labour market. The way this is usually formulated is considering first that, in 
addition to, productivity, the unemployment rate also affects nominal wage setting. 
Nevertheless, for some specifications the long-run unemployment rate, the NAIRU, remains 
exogenous, whereas in others there is a long-run relationship between wages and 
unemployment that will help to determine the equilibrium rate of unemployment as a function 
of third variables that measure structural properties of the labour market (i.e. Netherlands, Italy 
and Spain). Secondly, in most models the firm's labour demand is consistent with a price 
mark-up function over unit labour costs. Finally, another relevant modelling factor that will 
drive the dynamics of the labour market variables is how expectations affect wage formation. 
If those expectations are explicitly introduced, this is done through the consideration of wage 
contracts (i.e. Finland) or through inflation expectations equations (i.e. Germany, Italy and 
Belgium). The description of the wage setting is completed with a labour demand relationship 
derived from the production function. 
Figure 25 shows the responses of unemployment to the monetary shock across the 
euro area models as well as the aggregate value. For comparison, we have displayed 
separately the countries with larger and moderate effects41. The maximum effect appears in 
Spain, followed by Portugal, Greece and Italy. Finland also shows a very large response, but 
contrary to the other countries, here the adjustment occurs in the first two years. A similar 
ranking would appear if it were considered the employment response instead of the 
unemployment rate.  
Figure 26 displays the responses of real wages after the monetary tightening. The 
expected fall in real wages, derived from the reduction in aggregate demand, takes more than 
                                                                          
41. The splitting of countries is based on the comparison of the maximum response of unemployment. The same 
classification appears when considering the accumulated effect over the simulation period.  
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two years to become significant for most countries42.  Moreover the aggregate effect for the 
euro area is small compared with the estimated responses of unemployment. This is contrary 
to what is observed among the euro-area models (both the EDGE and the AWM) that display 
a much higher response of real wages which becomes significant two years after the shock. 
Finally, Figure 27 shows the real unit labour cost responses to the monetary shock. 
This is a very relevant variable, given its direct effect on the inflation rate. In general, unit 
labour costs do not fall on impact and take at least two years before starting to fall. The main 
reason may be that during the first two years the existing labour hoarding prompts a fall in 
productivity greater than that in real wages43. Once the rise in the unemployment rate exerts 
some pressure on real wages, this helps to reduce marginal costs and, therefore, the inflation 
rate. 
It is not clear how the results in Figures 25-27 square with the alternative ways the 
labour market variables have been modelled. In part, this is due to the fact that the differences 
in the way the NAIRU has been modelled, will not be important in the face of temporary 
changes in aggregate demand. In addition, as mentioned above, there are not large 
differences in the short-run specification of wages and employment equations across models. 
Nevertheless we find that the group of countries with larger unemployment effects (i.e. Spain, 
Greece, Italy, Portugal) is not too dissimilar from the corresponding group with with large GDP 
effects [see Van Els et al. (2001)], showing the relevance of the labour market variables in the 
propagation of the shock44. The degree of real wage rigidity, as an important source of 
inefficiency in the labour markets, should be reflected both by different estimated 
unemployment elasticities to wages and by a different degree of sluggishness in employment. 
Moreover, the degrees of nominal inertia should be associated with the presence of different 
coefficients of expected and lagged prices as well as with acceleration terms in the wage 
equations. A combination of both features is likely to be captured by the range of wage and 
employment responses across countries. Still, in section 2.3 we did not find a significant 
relationship between the monetary  results and some labour market variables. 
4.4 The Monetary and Expectational Channels 
Finally, we describe two country-specific channels of inflation expectations formation that are 
quantitatively relevant for the transmission of the monetary shocks: the monetary channel for 
Germany and the expectational channel for Italy. 
In most of the models reviewed, money plays a passive role since it does not interact 
with other endogenous variables. The exception to that rule is the Deutsche Bundesbank 
model. It has a monetary sector for the euro area with a long-run money demand equation 
and a P-Star definition consistent with such an equation. In the short run, inflation is a 
function of backward-looking and forward-looking expectations as well as of the price gap. 
Moreover, there is an interest rate reaction function that depends on the deviations of current 
money growth from its long-run level. 
After an interest rate shock, during the first two years prices and output rise in 
Germany, driven by the existence of a dominant exchange rate channel. This is common to 
other countries' transmission mechanisms (e.g. Netherlands, Belgium or Finland). But in the 
medium run (after the third year) there are significant effects caused by this monetary channel 
that are only present in the German model. Due to the strong fall in prices, real wages and 
consumption rise. Thus, the monetary channel is the main force reducing prices after the third 
year but it also contributes to a significant expansion in output. 
                                                                          
42. This pattern does not occur in Germany, as the fall in prices is much more marked than the fall in nominal wages. 
43. There are some exceptions, such as Spain, where the substantial elasticity of labour demand to output generates 
acyclical labour productivity movements. 
44. This pattern is not seen in Austria, where there is a above aggregate response of output, but a below aggregate 
response of unemployment.  
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In the Italian quarterly model the wage equation incorporates an inflation expectation 
term that is determined not only by cost variables, competitors' prices and demand 
measures, but also by the policy interest rate. This last term allows monetary policy to affect 
inflation expectations directly. As in the German case this is a channel that becomes 
important in the medium term, but quantitatively it plays a modest role in the total Italian 
output effect. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 33 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0502 
5 Conclusions 
This paper has examined possible explanations for observed variations in the transmission of 
euro area monetary policy in central bank models. To this end, it has examined available 
measures of the significance of these differences, assessed whether they appear plausible on 
economic grounds and considered the role played by differences in model design. With 
regard to the plausibility of the results, a broadly based approach was adopted, whereby 
results were compared with structural and institutional characteristics of the respective 
national economies and with established business cycle properties.  
Financial structures and the fiscal policy framework appear to make some 
contribution to explaining part of the heterogeneity in the responses of countries to a 
monetary policy shock. There also appears to be a role for the credit channel as various 
financial indicators show some relationship with the pattern of results. In addition, entry 
barriers and the pervasiveness of the employment protection legislation appear to raise the 
economic costs of adjusting after a monetary policy shock. Industrial structure does not seem 
to explain much of the detected cross-country differences in the transmission mechanism. In 
relation to the decomposition into channels of transmission, the magnitude of most channels 
appeared to bear at least some relation to prior beliefs based on information about the 
respective economies. 
With regard to business cycle properties, there appeared to be some evidence that 
the transmission results corresponded to cross-country differences in various business cycle 
‘stylised facts’. In particular, a high volatility of consumption observed in the business cycle 
data may be indicative of a greater sensitivity of consumption to changing interest rates. This 
pattern was observed in the WGEM results, where the magnitude of the substitution channel 
seemed to correspond to the volatility of private consumption. 
As a further robustness check, the results from the WGEM exercise were compared 
with some existing VAR evidence. However, it should be noted that the two sets of results are 
not strictly comparable, most importantly in their treatment of monetary policy actions, and, 
indeed, the quantitative results differ quite markedly. The cross-country distribution of the 
maximum impact on prices was broadly similar across the two competing methodologies. 
However, the cross-country differences in maximum output effects obtained using the VAR 
model did not correspond well to those generated in the WGEM simulations. 
Finally, the role of differences in model design was also investigated. It was found 
that the existence of alternative forward-looking elements in the models was one of the 
reasons for finding sizeable differences across model results, particularly with regard to the 
speed of adjustment. For the models that have explicitly incorporated market valuation of 
assets, the wealth channel becomes more significant. Irrespective of the way the NAIRU is 
modelled, the presence of the unemployment rate in the wage equation (or of other variables 
describing the non-competitive environment in the labour market) is a factor that influences 
how monetary policy affects the inflation rate. The monetary channel, that is incorporated into 
the German model, has an important impact on the transmission of monetary policy in this 
model. 
To summarise, against most yardsticks, the cross-country variation in the WGEM 
results was found to be plausible. The results broadly corresponded to the differences in 
business cycle properties across countries and most –but not all– economic, financial and 
structural statistics. When compared against the VAR evidence, the results were more mixed 
with similarities in the pattern of price –but not output– responses. Nevertheless, despite 
these signs that the results may reflect underlying economic differences, the role of differing 
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modelling strategies should not be ignored. Important features of the models –for instance in 
the treatment of expectations or wealth– can have a major bearing on the results that may not 
necessarily reflect differences in the underlying economies. 
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 35 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0502 
REFERENCES 
AGRESTI, A. M., and B. MOJÓN (2001). Some Stylised Facts on the Euro Area Business Cycle, ECB Working Paper N.º 
95. 
ANGELONI, I., and L. DEDOLA (1999). From the ERM to the Euro: New Evidence on Economic and Policy Convergence 
among EU Countries, ECB Working Paper N.º 4. 
ANGELONI, I., A. KASHYAP, B. MOJÓN, and D. TERLIZZESSE (2003). “The output composition puzzle: a difference in 
the monetary transmission mechanism in the euro area and US”, forthcoming in the Journal of Money Credit and 
Banking. 
BEAN, C. (1999). “The single monetary policy: one size fits all?” in EMU: Realignments In and Out of the Eurozone, Royal 
Institute for International Affairs, London. 
–– (2000). Monetary policy under EMU, mimeo. 
BLANCHARD, O. (1985). “Debt, deficit and finite horizons”, Journal of Political Economy, 93, pp. 223-247. 
BRAYTON, F., and P. TYNSLEY (1995). Polynomial Generalization of Dynamic Frictions in Structural Macro Models, FRB 
Staff Working Paper. 
CAMPA, J. M., and J. M. GONZÁLEZ-MÍNGUEZ (2002). Differences in Exchange Rate Pass-Through in the Euro Area, 
Banco de España Working Paper N.º 0222. 
CECCHETTI, S. G. (1999). “Legal structure, financial structure and the monetary policy transmission mechanism”, FRB 
of New York, Economic Policy Review, 5 (2), pp. 9-28. 
CECCHETTI, S G., and R. W. RICH (1999). Structural estimates of the US sacrifice ratio, mimeo. 
DE GRAUWE, P. (1995). The Economics of Convergence towards Monetary Union in Europe, Centre for Economic 
Policy Discussion Paper N.º 1213, London. 
DEDOLA, L., and F. LIPPI (2000). “The monetary Transmission Mechanism: Evidence from Industries of five OECD 
countries”, Banca d'Italy, Termi di Discussione, 389. 
EHRMANN, M., and A. WORMS (2001). Interbank Lending and Monetary Policy Transmission: Evidence for Germany, 
Bundesbank Discussion Paper 11/01. 
EICHENGREEN, B. J., and T. BAYOUMI (1993). “Shocking aspects of European monetary unification”, in European 
Monetary Unification: Theory, Practice and Analysis, B. J. Eichengreen (ed), Cambridge, MIT Press. 
VAN ELS, P., A. LOCARNO, J. MORGAN, and J. P. VILLETELLE (2001). Monetary Policy Transmission in the Euro Area: 
What Do Aggregate and Structural Models Tell US, ECB Working Paper N.º 94. 
KOUPARITSAS, M. A. (1999). “Is the EMU a viable common currency area? A VAR analysis of regional business cycles”, 
Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. 
LAYARD, R., S. NICKELL, and R. JACKMAN (1991). Unemployment. Macroeconomic Performance and the Labour 
Market, Oxford, New York, Toronto and Melbourne, Oxford University Press. 
LUDWIG, A., and T. SLOK (2002). The Impact of Changes in Stock Prices and House Prices on Consumption in OECD 
Countries, IMF Working Paper N.º 02/1. 
MCADAM, P., and J. MORGAN (2001). The Monetary Transmission Mechanism at the Euro-Area Level: Issues and 
Results using Structural Macroeconomic Models, ECB Working Paper N.º 93. 
MASSARO, R., and E. LÄÄKÄRI (2002). “The European and euro-zone financial structure”, Statistics in focus, Theme 2, 
18/2002, Eurostat. 
MIHOV, I. (2001). “One monetary policy in EMU”, Economic Policy. 
MOJON, B., and G. PEERSMAN (2001). A VAR Description of the Effects of Monetary Policy in the  Individual Countries 
of the Euro Area, ECB Working Paper N.º 92. 
VAN DEN NOORD, P. (2000). The Size and Role of Automatic Fiscal Stabilisers in the 1990s and Beyond, OECD 
Economics Department Working Papers N.º 230. 
PEERSMAN, G. (2002). The Transmission of Monetary Policy in the Euro Area: Are the Effects Different  across 
Countries?, Ghent University Working Paper N.º 148. 
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 36 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0502 
Table 1.  Common monetary policy simulation: Magnitude and Timing of the 
Response of GDP 
 
σi F-test p-value ρi t-test p-value
Belgium 0.034 2.241 0.043 0.813 5.925 0.000
Germany 0.067 1.707 0.126 0.758 4.932 0.000
Greece 0.095 3.473 0.005 0.798 5.620 0.000
Spain 0.075 2.151 0.052 0.627 3.410 0.003
France 0.037 1.948 0.078 0.978 19.946 0.000
Ireland 0.067 1.754 0.115 0.873 7.577 0.000
Italy 0.090 3.131 0.008 0.830 6.314 0.000
Lux 0.050 1.026 0.478 0.682 3.955 0.001
Neth 0.057 1.266 0.306 0.657 3.696 0.002
Austria 0.057 1.255 0.313 0.701 4.172 0.001
Portugal 0.118 5.376 0.000 0.611 3.278 0.004
Finland 0.149 8.497 0.000 0.300 1.335 0.199
 
 
Note: 
The first three columns report for each country the interim (20 periods) standard deviation 
(σi) of the response of output to a monetary policy shock, the value of the F-statistic and 
the corresponding p-value for testing whether output variability is the same in country i as 
in the aggregate of EMU. The next three columns show the correlation coefficients 
between output response in country i and in the average of the euro-area (ρi), the value of 
the t-statistics and the corresponding p-value for testing whether the patterns of responses 
at the country and aggregate level are the same. 
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Table 2.  Common monetary policy simulation: Magnitude and Timing of the 
Response of Consumer Spending 
 
σi F-test p-value ρi t-test p-value
Belgium 0.006 40.345 0.000 -0.984 -23.394 0.000
Germany 0.023 2.644 0.020 0.336 1.512 0.148
Greece 0.091 5.943 0.000 0.792 5.506 0.000
Spain 0.057 2.316 0.037 0.555 2.832 0.011
France 0.045 1.490 0.196 0.880 7.850 0.000
Ireland 0.067 3.253 0.007 0.476 2.296 0.034
Italy 0.102 7.461 0.000 0.834 6.408 0.000
Lux 0.083 4.996 0.000 0.568 2.930 0.009
Neth 0.040 1.149 0.383 -0.080 -0.340 0.738
Austria 0.048 1.634 0.147 0.735 4.600 0.000
Portugal 0.264 50.229 0.000 0.879 7.835 0.000
Finland 0.174 21.965 0.000 -0.416 -1.938 0.068
 
Note: 
As in Table 1 
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Table 3.  Common monetary policy simulation: Magnitude and Timing of the 
Response of the Consumption Deflator 
 
σi F-test p-value ρi t-test p-value
Belgium 0.029 2.610 0.021 0.829 6.280 0.000
Germany 0.057 1.518 0.185 0.956 13.815 0.000
Greece 0.071 2.327 0.037 0.855 6.995 0.000
Spain 0.091 3.771 0.003 0.822 6.131 0.000
France 0.026 3.164 0.008 0.859 7.133 0.000
Ireland 0.031 2.228 0.044 0.902 8.865 0.000
Italy 0.057 1.492 0.195 0.936 11.288 0.000
Lux 0.015 9.869 0.000 0.824 6.168 0.000
Neth 0.048 1.054 0.455 0.935 11.200 0.000
Austria 0.031 2.331 0.036 0.293 1.299 0.210
Portugal 0.046 1.049 0.459 0.900 8.780 0.000
Finland 0.159 11.603 0.000 0.435 2.050 0.055
 
Note: 
As in Table 1 
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Table 4.  Common monetary policy simulation: Magnitude and Timing of the 
Response of the GDP 
 
σi F-test p-value ρi t-test p-value
Belgium 0.022 4.724 0.001 0.881 7.915 0.000
Germany 0.065 1.787 0.107 0.913 9.522 0.000
Greece 0.067 1.907 0.084 0.708 4.259 0.000
Spain 0.095 3.839 0.003 0.940 11.687 0.000
France 0.027 3.293 0.006 0.966 15.935 0.000
Ireland 0.041 1.412 0.229 0.964 15.397 0.000
Italy 0.059 1.474 0.203 0.812 5.902 0.000
Lux 0.024 4.116 0.002 0.635 3.487 0.003
Neth 0.075 2.368 0.034 0.774 5.193 0.000
Austria 0.016 8.975 0.000 0.701 4.174 0.001
Portugal 0.046 1.101 0.418 0.892 8.387 0.000
Finland 0.119 5.969 0.000 0.021 0.091 0.929
 
Note: 
As in Table 1 
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Table 5.  Cyclical Bahviour of the Euro Area Economics: Volatility of Macro Time 
Series45 
 
Countries GDP Consumption Investment Wages 
Belgium 1.85 1.67 7.35 2.42 
Germany 2.03 1.92 4.81 3.36 
Greece 2.15 2.35 8.06 5.27 
Spain 2.27 2.63 7.15 4.05 
France 1.61 1.79 4.51 4.41 
Ireland 3.08 3.45 9.32 7.60 
Italy 2.38 2.16 4.88 7.23 
Luxembourg 3.17 2.19 10.01 1.73 
Netherlands 1.48 1.86 4.51 1.84 
Austria 1.73 2.08 5.86 2.16 
Portugal 2.57 3.24 8.69 4.84 
Finland 3.25 3.04 9.86 4.34 
 
                                                                          
45. Standard deviation of year-on-year changes 
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Table 6.  Comparing the WEGEM Simulations and the VAR Evidence 
 
 Peersman (2002) WGEM (rescaled) 
Real GDP Maximum 
impact (%) 
Lag (quarters) Maximum 
impact (%) 
Lag (quarters) 
Belgium -0.20 3 -0.05 3 
Germany -0.18 4 -0.09 3 
Spain -0.18 4 -0.07 5 
France -0.17 3 -0.05 3 
Italy -0.21 4 -0.11 4 
Netherlands -0.13 5 -0.07 3 
Austria -0.18 4 -0.10 4 
Prices     
Belgium -0.09 20 -0.03 3 
Germany -0.05 20 -0.05 11 
Spain -0.19 20 -0.07 14 
France -0.09 20 -0.02 2 
Italy -0.16 20 -0.05 3 
Netherlands -0.06 1 -0.05 3 
Austria -0.05 20 -0.03 1 
Inflation     
Belgium -0.08 10 -0.03 3 
Germany -0.10 10 -0.03 5 
Spain -0.12 4 -0.05 6 
France -0.06 11 -0.02 2 
Italy -0.14 5 -0.05 3 
Netherlands -0.01 12 -0.05 3 
Austria -0.09 8 -0.03 1 
Note: 
The maximum lag is equal to 20 quarters. 
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Table 7 
slope t-stat p-value d.o.f R 2
Stock market capitalisation -0.003 -0.594 0.284 9 0.038
MFI loans to non-financial sector -0.005 -0.552 0.297 9 0.033
MFI loans to non-financial corporations 0.017 0.886 0.801 9 0.080
MFI loans to non-financial sector (< 1 year) 0.042 1.560 0.923 9 0.213
MFI loans to households -0.015 -1.354 0.104 9 0.169
MFI morgages to households -0.015 -1.205 0.129 9 0.139
Consumer credit 0.040 0.593 0.716 9 0.038
Total number of credit institutions 0.011 1.751 0.938 7 0.305
Credit institutions from other EA countries 0.092 0.587 0.712 7 0.047
Credit institutions from non EA countries -1.669 -1.643 0.081 5 0.351
Herfindahl Index 1.080 0.288 0.609 6 0.014
Market share of the five largest banks 0.005 0.473 0.675 7 0.031
Total assets of the banking sector (% GDP) -0.003 -1.212 0.128 9 0.140
Number of firms issuing shares 0.032 1.284 0.884 9 0.155
Average capitalisation of firms issuing shares 0.000 -2.639 0.013 9 0.436
Firms with less than 10 employees -0.003 -0.130 0.450 9 0.002
Firms with less than 50 employees 0.001 0.036 0.514 9 0.000
Firms with less than 250 employees 0.011 0.540 0.699 9 0.031
Firms with 250 employees or more -0.013 -0.628 0.273 9 0.042
Financial structure and monetary policy transmission
 
Note: 
This table reports the results from a regression where the sacrifice ratio (computed focusing on the 
response of the unemployment rate and the GDP deflator in the first five years of the simulation 
experiment) is regressed on each of the above variables in turn. The first column reports the slope 
coefficient, the second its t-statistic, the third the probability value, the fourth the associated degrees of 
freedom and the final column reports the R-squared from each pairwise regression.  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 43 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0502 
Table 8 
slope t-stat p-value d.o.f R 2
Share of manufacturing sector -4.539 -0.933 0.375 9 0.088
Openness -0.514 -0.909 0.387 9 0.084
Product market flexibility index 0.211 0.418 0.686 9 0.019
State control 0.239 0.966 0.359 9 0.094
Barriers to entrepreneurship -0.540 -1.436 0.185 9 0.186
Barriers to trade and investment 1.252 2.013 0.075 9 0.311
Economic regulation 0.273 0.934 0.375 9 0.088
Administrative regulation -0.531 -1.813 0.103 9 0.268
Replacement ratio -2.422 -1.125 0.298 7 0.153
Employment protection legislation 0.036 1.916 0.104 6 0.380
Union density 0.008 0.707 0.502 7 0.067
Union coverage 0.007 0.262 0.801 7 0.010
Coordination in wage bargaining 0.005 0.008 0.994 7 0.000
Wage indexation -0.111 -1.000 0.343 9 0.100
Sacrifice ratios, nominal inertia and real rigidities
 
Note: 
As in Table 7 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 44 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0502 
Table 9.  Conventional Channels of Monetary Transmission in ESCB Models46 
 
 Substitution Cost of 
capital 
Cash-flow/ 
income 
Wealth Exchang
e rate 
Spillover 
Belgium S P S P P P 
Germany P P P N P P 
Greece P P N N P P 
Spain P S P N P P 
France P S P N P P 
Ireland P S N P P P 
Italy P P P P P P 
Luxembourg P P P P P P 
Netherlands P P S S P P 
Austria P S P N P P 
Portugal P P P N P P 
Finland P P P S P P 
 
P (channel present), S (channel present, but has special feature) and N (channel not present). 
 
                                                                          
46. Channels which were present at the time of the WGEM experiment in 2001. 
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Table 10.  A summary of the direct interest rate effects in private investment and 
consumption 
 
 Private investment Private consumption 
Germany Direct effect of long-term interest 
rates and indirect influence through 
long-term rate’s effect on the 
present value of depreciation 
allowances and on the user costs 
of machinery and equipment, which 
affects the investment deflator. 
Real long rate affects real 
consumption per capita. 
Greece Effect via a user cost of capital term Direct interest rate effect. 
Spain Real user cost of capital (long rate) Real long-term interest rate 
France Both the short- and the long-term 
interest rate play a role, but through 
the cash-flow effect only. 
Direct real short term interest rate 
effect 
Ireland Effect via cost of capital term which 
is the long-term interest rate and 
corporate borrowing costs. 
Real short-term interest rates effect 
short-run consumption. 
Italy Equipment investment depends on 
the cost of capital, which is defined 
in terms of a convex combination of 
the yield of Treasury bonds (long-
term rate) and the average loan rate 
(averaged over short and long 
maturities). Investment in structures 
depends  on the average loan rate. 
Residential investment is a function 
of the short-term loan rate. 
Durables consumption depends on 
the interest rate on short-term 
loans, while non-durables 
consumption is affected by a 
longer-term interest rate (treasury 
bond yield).  
Luxembourg Cost of capital term combining 
short- and long-term interest rate 
Real long-term interest rate 
 
Netherlands Weighted average of short and long 
rates. 
Long-term interest rate 
Austria Direct effect of bank lending rate Direct effect of the bank lending 
rate 
Portugal Effect via cost of capital term which 
is the average of a short- and long-
term interest rate. 
Direct effect of real short-term 
interest rate. 
Finland Effect via cost the rental price of 
capital which is affected by the 
short-term interest rate. 
Direct effect of the bank lending 
rate. 
Source: Van Els et al. (2001). 
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Table 11.  Euro area models’ properties:  Modelling expectations 
 
Forward-looking elements 
Backward-looking 
On inflation On financial markets 
On financial markets 
and goods markets 
Greece 
Spain 
 France 
Ireland 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Germany 
Italy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area Wide Model 
(AWM) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Belgium 
Finland 
EDGE (Euro Area) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 47 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0502 
Table 12.  Euro area models’ properties:  Highly forward looking models 
 
 Estimated Calibrated 
Belgium: Polynomial adjustment cost 
consistent with an auxiliary 
VAR 
EDGE 
 Combine model-consistent 
expectations and backward- 
looking expectations Finland: Quadratic adjustment costs  
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Table 13.  Euro area models’ properties:  Importance of the forward-lookingness in 
the two estimated euro models 
Years after the shock 1 2 3 4 5 
Price effect (%) 
Finland -0.53 -0.50 -0.17 -0.02 -0.08 
Belgium -0.10 -0.18 -0.21 -0.17 -0.12 
Aggregate of the euro area 
models -0.09 -0.21 -0.31 -0.40 -0.40 
Output efect (%) 
Finland -0.34 -0.24 -0.15 -0.22 -0.25 
Belgium -0.15 -0.20 -0.10 -0.05 -0.03 
Aggregate of the euro area 
models -0.22 -0.38 -0.31 -014 -0.02 
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Table 14.  Treatment of wealth valuation across the Euro Area models 
 
No wealth 
variable 
considered 
Market value of wealth is 
exogenous 
(only changes in asset holdings) 
Considers changes in wealth 
valuation 
(financial assets and/or housing) 
 Greece 
 France 
 Austria 
 Portugal 
Belgium 
Germany 
Spain 
Ireland 
Luxembourg 
AWM 
Finland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
EDGE 
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Table 15.  The importance of modelling the wealth channel 
 
Output effect and wealth channel effect (in brackets) 
Year after the shock 1 2 3 4 5 
Models that consider changes in wealth valuation 
Netherlands -0.20 
(0.0) 
-0.27 
(-0.02) 
-0.25 
(-0.02) 
-0.22 
(-0.01) 
-0.16 
(-0.01) 
Finland -0.34 
(-0.01) 
-0.24 
(0.01) 
-0.15 
(0.01) 
-0.22 
(0.00) 
-0.25 
(0.00) 
Italy -0.26 
(-0.01) 
-0.60 
(-0.01) 
-0.55 
(-0.07) 
-0.21 
(0.01) 
0.05 
(0.07) 
Models with exogenous wealth effects 
Belgium -0.15 
(0.00) 
-0.20 
(0.00) 
-0.10 
(0.00) 
-0.05 
(0.00) 
-0.03 
(0.00) 
Luxembourg -0.17 
(0.00) 
-0.25 
(0.00) 
-0.27 
(0.00) 
-0.23 
(0.00) 
-0.15 
(0.00) 
Ireland -0.25 
(0.01) 
-0.48 
(0.03) 
-0.43 
(0.03) 
-0.38 
(0.02) 
-0.32 
(0.00) 
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Figure1 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Common monetary policy simulation
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Figure 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 
SR1 is the ratio between the output and the consumption deflator at the trough and SR2 uses the GDP 
deflator instead. SR3 is the ratio between the variances of output and the consumption deflator and SR4 
uses the GDP deflator instead. SR5 uses the peak period for unemployment and the through period for 
the GDP deflator. 
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Figure 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Spearman rank correlation = 0.58 (p-value 0.05). 
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Figure 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Spearman rank correlation = 0.58 (p-value 0.05). 
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Figure 7 
 
 Volatility of Investment and the response of output in the short-run 
Cost of capital channel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Spearman rank correlation = 0.44 (p-value 0.11), excluding Greece and Luxembourg. 
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Figure 8 
 
Volatility of wages and the response of prices in the long-run 
Domestic channels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Spearman rank correlation = 0.57 (p-value 0.08), excluding Ireland. 
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Figure 9 
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Figure 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Spearman rank correlation = 0.43 (p-value 0.37) 
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Figure 11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social preferences and monetary policy
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Figure 12.  Magnitude of the substitution channel 
 
Figure 13.  The substitution channel and the consumers’ expenditure properties 
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(a) Eurostat (b) Self-employment as a proportion of total employment, Eurostat. 
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Figure 14.  The substitution channel and the labour market 
 
 
Figure 15 Magnitude of the cost of capital channel 
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(a) Union density and the output effects of the 
substitution channel 
(b) Unemployment benefit replacement ratio and 
the output effects of the substitution channel 
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(a) Trade union density ratio for 1994 (or nearest year), OECD (b) Average replacement ratio for 4 categories of workers expressed 
in relation to the average production wage, OECD. 
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Figure 16 The cost of capital channel and the firms structure 
 
(a) Non-financial firm’s interest payments and 
the output effects of the cost of capital channel 
(b) Share of small firms and the output effects of 
the cost of capital channel 
Spearman Rank Correlation  = -0.31 Spearman Rank Correlation  = -0.39 
(c) Manufacturing share of output and the 
output effects of the cost of capital channel 
Spearman Rank Correlation  = -0.38 
(a) Net interest paid by non-financial firms as a percentage of the net disposable income (2000), Eurostat. 
(b) Employment in firms with 0-9 employees as percent of private sector employment, (1996), European 
survey on small and medium enterprises. (c) Value added in manufacturing as a proportion of total value 
added, Eurostat. 
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Figure 17 Magnitude of the income channel 
 
Price effects Output effects 
  
 
 
Figure 18 The income channel and the agents’ financial position 
 
(a) Net interest receipts as a proportion of net 
income and the output effects of the income channel 
(b) Proportion of household financing that is 
short-term and the output effects of the income channel 
Spearman Rank Correlation =  0.47 Spearman Rank Correlation = -0.49 
(a) Net interest paid by households as a percentage of the net disposable income (2000), 
Eurostat. (b) Households’ short term bank loans over total bank loans (2000), Eurostat. 
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Figure 19 Magnitude of the wealth channel 
 
Price effects Output effects 
  
 
 
Figure 20 Market capitalisation and the output effects of the wealth channel 
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Figure 21 Magnitude of the exchange rate channel 
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Figure 22 The exchange rate channel and the openness and sectoral 
composition 
 
(a) Share of raw materials and fuel in imports 
and price effects of the exchange rate channel 
(b) Share of large firms and output effects of the 
exchange rate channel 
Spearman Rank Correlation  = -0.10 Spearman Rank Correlation  = -0.31 
(a) Eurostat, (b) Employment in firms with over 250 employees as per cent of private 
sector employment, (1996), European survey on small and medium enterprises. 
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Figure 23 Magnitude of the spillover channel 
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Figure 24 The spìllover channel and the trade structure 
 
(a) Intra-EU 12 imports and price effects of the 
spillover channel 
(b) Intra-EU 12 total trade and output effects of 
the spillover channel 
Spearman Rank Correlation = -0.22 Spearman Rank Correlation =  -0.41 
Source: Eurostat 
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Figure 25 The spìllover channel and the trade structure 
 
Labour market variables and monetary policy simulation: 
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Figure 26 
Labour market variables and monetary policy simulation: 
 
 
 
 
 
Real Wages (%): large effects
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Figure 27 
 
Labour market variables and monetary policy simulation: 
 
 
 
 
Real Unit Labour Costs (%): large effects
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